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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper investigates whether South African directors are able to earn abnormal returns by 
trading in their companies’ shares. An event study methodology was used based on the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model for director’s trades during the period 2009 to 2012. The results 
suggest sales transactions are associated with a greater market reaction than purchases.  A 
better market indication is received from indirectly beneficial trades than directly beneficial, 
specifically for sales.  Upon further analysis, we find significantly higher abnormal returns for 
larger value trades.  For purchases, single director trades provide a stronger market reaction 
than multiple director trades. In contrast, sales transactions provide a stronger signal when 
they are from multiple directors than single directors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate insiders are assumed to know the most about their company as they are likely to 
be more aware of when profits are declining, costs increasing etc. (Lakonishok and Lee , 2001). 
They have intimate knowledge of the operations of a company and have easy access to 
financial performance data (Hotson, Kaur and Singh, 2007). As a result of their supposed 
informational advantage, it has been hypothesised that insiders can earn abnormal returns 
by trading on their knowledge. The public are aware of this and tend to monitor insider trades 
closely for any hope of also earning an abnormal return. Abnormal returns are measured as 
the difference between a stock’s performance and the expected return of its benchmark over 
a certain holding period.  
Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (1999) outline three reasons why corporate insider profits 
should be studied i.e. implications for market efficiency, developing optimal trading strategies 
and effects of insider profits on fairness and market performance. There have been numerous 
studies done on abnormal profits earned by corporate insiders and abnormal profits earned 
by outsiders who imitate insider trades. Most of this research has been done outside South 
Africa, predominantly in the United States of America (USA) and many in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and Germany. Insiders are classified differently across countries but all are prohibited 
from trading on non-disclosed material information. Directors, shareholders holding more 
than 10% of any equity class and other key employees make up the insider definition in the 
USA (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). The slightly more restrictive definition in the UK includes 
executive and non-executive directors and excludes large shareholders and other key 
employees (Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog, 2006).  In terms of the South African Insider 
Trading Act, 1998 (South African Government Gazette, 1998), an insider is a director, 
employee or shareholder who has access to insider information. In South Africa, insider trades 
refer to the illegal buying or selling of a security by someone that has material non-public 
information about the security. This study uses the international definition which refers more 
generally to directors trading in their own companies. This paper investigates whether 
abnormal profits are earned by directors of South African companies trading in their 
company’s shares. Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) top 100 companies’ director trades 
over the period 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2012 were used in this study. The CAPM 
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model was used to estimate the expected returns of the shares over the period. We 
conducted an event study examining insider trading activity over the period to work out the 
cumulative average abnormal return for purchases and sales separately. We also split the 
data by direct/indirectly beneficial trades, high/low transaction size and single/multiple 
directors’ trades to see if this has any impact on the returns. The CAARs were also tested to 
see if they were significantly different from zero.   
The rest of the study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the relevant local and 
international literature on this topic. Thereafter, the data and methodology is discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. A discussion of the results is provided in Chapter 5, after which the 
conclusion is presented in Chapter 6.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The literature review begins by providing an overview of market efficiency and its 
implications. It is then further divided into studies on director trading done locally and 
internationally. The majority of studies occurred internationally, predominantly in the United 
States, as there is limited research on the topic for the South African market.  
2.2 Market Efficiency 
 
The random walk hypothesis was developed by Kendall (1953), who proposed that share 
prices were random and unpredictable. This theory was further enhanced by Fama (1965 b) 
who developed the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), suggesting that in an efficient market 
prices reflect all available information. As new information becomes available, the security’s 
price adjusts immediately to reflect the market’s perception of the securities value. As a 
result, no under-priced or overpriced securities should exist. Mispriced securities are 
identified through active investment management. However, if stock markets are efficient 
then passive active management would be the logical alternative as there will be no need to 
pay any fees for identifying mispricing when stock prices always reflect the available 
information.  
Fama (1970) alluded to three forms of market efficiency i.e. strong form, semi-strong form 
and weak form efficiency. Weak form efficiency suggests that current stock prices reflect past 
prices, whereas semi-strong-form efficiency depicts stock prices to reflect currently available 
public information in addition to past data (Fama, 1970). Fama then extends strong-form 
efficiency to include all public and non-public information in stock prices.  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), first proposed by Sharpe (1964), embodies the 
theories of EMH. Portfolios are exposed to systematic and unsystematic risk, whereby 
unsystematic risk can be diversified away and as systematic risk affects all assets in the 
market, it can’t be diversified away. If markets are efficient then additional returns can only 
be earned through undiversifiable risk. Beta measures volatility of a security in comparison to 
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the market as a whole. The CAPM thus states that beta is the only relevant measure of risk 
and as a result investors can only outperform the market by being exposed to more 
systematic risk. The CAPM model uses the risk free rate and a market premium for bearing 
risk, based on the systematic risk exposed to. If all investors have homogenous expectations, 
Sharpe (1964) showed that all investors will hold a portfolio consisting of a risky asset and risk 
free assets. The risky asset will be the same for all investors, i.e. the market portfolio. The risk 
free rate is determined by the investor’s level of risk aversion.  
Efficient market theory assumes investors are rational and that a security’s market price 
reflects all information as it is released. This contradicts with behavioural finance which states 
that investors frequently behave irrationally. There have been various contributors to 
behavioural financial theory proposing cognitive biases that restrict investor rationality. 
Various anomalies have been identified which allows investors to earn abnormal returns. 
However, supporters of the CAPM have claimed that these abnormal returns are not 
profitable as one has to still take into account transaction costs.  
Strong form market efficiency is inconsistent with the existence of insider profits and it 
assumes that monopolistic access to information does not cause an individual to have higher 
trading profits than others (Finnerty, 1976). To test for strong form efficiency, insider profits 
earned from their transactions need to be compared to that of the general market. Abnormal 
profits earned by outsiders who mimic insiders’ trades are a violation of the semi-strong form 
market efficiency. This is considered the “insider trading anomaly” by Dickgiesser and Kaserer 
(2010). Finnerty (1976) suggested that insiders buy securities of smaller sized companies with 
larger earnings and larger dividends as abnormal returns are higher for these companies. The 
cause of the insider trading anomaly could thus be the incorrect estimation of abnormal 
returns due to the size and earnings/price ratio effects (Rozeff and Zaman ,1988). Non zero 
abnormal returns that remain after a corporate event are thus considered inconsistent with 
market efficiency at the semi-strong form level. If markets are efficient in responding to 
insiders supposed informative trades, then we expect a significant market response around 
reporting dates (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).  
The analysis of post-event returns provides information on market efficiency. Event studies 
analyse the behaviour of companies’ stock prices around corporate events (Kothari,2006). 
Now that a foundation has been provided to illustrate the fundamentals of market efficiency 
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and how event study methodologies can be used to test semi-strong form efficiency, we 
examine the primary area of the study – director’s trading. 
 
2.3 International Studies on Directors’ Trading 
  
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) examined over one million insider trades on the NYSE, AMEX and 
Nasdaq during the 1975-1995 period and surprisingly observed little stock price changes 
around the trade date and even less around the reporting dates. They found that smaller 
companies are priced less efficiently than large companies and it is thus easier to exploit the 
insider trading activity. They found abnormal returns were dependent on size for trade dates 
but not around reporting dates. After adjusting for size and B/M, they found that abnormal 
returns decreased. Seyhun (1986), who examined 1975 to 1981 US trades, found that 
directors of small firms earn greater returns than those of large firms. A later study by Dardas 
and Guttler (2011), found the same result for the 2003-2009 period for various European 
trades. Hotson, Kaur and Singh (2007) also found abnormal returns for purchases and sales 
for directors of small companies. Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate 
abnormal returns to securities, may lead to biases in abnormal return estimation. Therefore, 
they use the market model to measure the expected returns as this avoids the CAPM bias.  
If small companies see a concentration of abnormal returns, it may be due to the small firm 
effect (Fama and French, 1992). When companies with small market capitalisation 
outperform those with a large market capitalisation after adjusting for risk, this is known as 
the small firm effect (Banz, 1981). Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis (1994) examined UK 
data over the period 1984 to 1986 and found significant abnormal returns in smaller firms. 
However, over the period investigated, small firms generally outperformed the market index 
and therefore the size effect could be the reason for the abnormal returns. They found that 
abnormal returns from buy signals become less significant and from sell signals become 
insignificant after the size effect is allowed for. Contrary to the studies above, in Germany, 
firms with a larger market capitalisation seem to provide a bigger signal and have lower levels 
of information asymmetry (Klinge, Seifert and Stehle, 2005).  
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Lakonishok and Lee (2001) discovered higher abnormal returns for purchases than sales and 
Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey (1997) found the same, excluding transaction costs, for their 1985 
to 1990 US sample. Rozeff and Zaman (1988) found that purchases tend to be concentrated 
in small stocks and insider sales in large stocks in their 1973-1982 US data. Dardas and Guttler 
(2011) find that the extent of the announcement effect is higher for purchases than for sales. 
If stock prices are already overvalued, they are less sensitive to insider trading signals 
(Dickgiesser and Kaserer, 2010). Rozeff and Zaman (1998) investigated investor overreaction 
based on US growth and value stock categories over the 1978 to 1991 period. If insiders then 
do have an informational advantage, they would want to take advantage of mispricing by 
buying more value stocks and selling more growth stocks. They discover that insiders buy 
more than sell as more stocks become value stocks. A second finding was that as single 
securities change from the growth to the value categories, insiders buy more value stocks. 
Additionally, after stocks experience high returns, insiders sell more. Their findings are in line 
with an overreaction hypothesis which depicts that prices of value stocks are inclined to lie 
below fundamental values, and prices of growth stocks likely lie above fundamental values.  
Interpretations of these findings are that insiders sell to diversify their portfolio because as 
prices increase more of their capital is tied up in a single share. They suggest insiders hold a 
greater percentage of growth stocks which is why there is more selling in growth stocks. Their 
findings propose that insiders are most likely to sell growth stocks as they are less risky and 
buy value stocks which are more risky. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) suggest that insiders are 
contrarian and prefer to buy historically good performing value stocks.  
Some insiders trade to merely rearrange or diversify their portfolios (Rozeff and Zaman, 
1988).  Insider purchases are generally made to earn profits, whereas sales could be for many 
reasons i.e. portfolio reallocation, option exercises, liquidity or because they feel the share 
price over-values the firm (Nair, 2008). Hamill, Mcilkenny and Opong (2002) investigate the 
price reactions to insider trades of U.K. small capitalised stocks during the period 1994- 1997. 
They propose that directors of small companies may be the founders and thus may still have 
a substantial shareholding compared to the directors of large companies. When they trade it 
is assumed that it is for the expectation of a positive return in the future and to mitigate future 
loss. When directors purchase shares it could be seen as confidence in their company’s future 
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as they are unlikely to invest more money if they have negative expectations about the 
company.  
 
Dickgiesser and Kaserer (2010) and Dardas and Guttler (2011) suggest that larger price 
reactions are caused by bigger trades. Contrary to their study, Klinge, Seifert and Stehle (2005) 
found bigger transaction values showed a lower quality of signal. Ajlouni and Toms (2008) 
examined FTSE100 companies over the 1999-2000 period and found transaction sizes did not 
increase the signal.  Small transactions might be for liquidity needs whereas larger 
transactions could be the result of analysing a company’s performance (Givoly and Palmon, 
1985). They examined a shorter period of US data i.e. 1973-1975.  
Multiple trades are found to be a more credible signal to the market, as the price reaction 
seems stronger when many directors trade on the same day (Fidrmuc, Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2006) and (Dardas and Guttler, 2011). Ajlouni and Toms (2008) found multiple 
buy transactions do not make a bigger difference to the signal than does an individual buy 
transaction. However, for sell transactions they found that multiple transactions increase the 
signal sent and abnormal return earned. The reason for the difference was suggested as being 
due to the market being unsure of an individual sale being for personal liquidity needs or for 
price expectations of the stock. Therefore, subsequent sell trades add some credibility to the 
motivation behind the sale. Buy transactions do not need the same kind of reassurance as 
they are usually done with the intention to make a profit.  
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) found that trading by managers proved to be more informative 
than that of large shareholders and they also seemed to be more contrarian than the latter 
i.e. they purchase shares when they are being sold by the market and sell shares when they 
are being bought by the market. They suggest that often executives invest in their companies’ 
stocks as their compensation schemes are linked to company share performance. Executive 
compensation structures changed during the period of their study and thus more emphasis 
was placed on aligning managers and shareholders’ interests. Over time, more of managers’ 
wealth is likely be in their own stocks and they will have an incentive to diversify their 
portfolios which will result in sales increases.  They find that markets generally do well when 
they sense positive expectations through directors buying and generally do poorly when they 
suspect doubt through directors selling. Directors also tend to buy cheap stocks and sell stocks 
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that are not performing well. They conclude that the market under reacts to directors signals. 
Seyhun (1986) proposed the information hierarchy hypothesis, which states that the 
information content of the transactions depends on the type of director who trades. Each 
insider has a different quality of information. They went further to suggest that insiders who 
are more involved in daily decision-making, such as directors, trade on more valuable 
information than shareholders. They seem to be more successful in predicting the future 
stock prices. Further to that, insiders will wait to buy stock until the release of unfavourable 
information and will sell stock only after favourable information is released. A later study by 
Dickgiesser and Kaserer (2010) found smaller abnormal returns by the supervisory board and 
management than directors. Contrary to this, Klinge, Seifert and Stehle (2005) found that 
trades of members of the supervisory board seem to give a stronger signal than those of 
directors. Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) report that in the UK, CEO transactions 
also result in lower CAARs than transactions made by other insiders. Large firms generally 
include more non-executive directors which could be a reason why their directors are not as 
closely involved with the firm and, because large firms are also more public, the share price 
reaction could also be faster (Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis, 1994). Top level executives 
have been found to have a lower abnormal return than other directors (Dardas and Guttler, 
2011). A suggested reason for this could be because top insiders are closely watched by 
regulatory authorities and the public and, as a result, they do not want to attract attention by 
gaining big returns on their company’s shares. As a disguise they could use multiple small 
transactions to attract less attention (Givoly and Palmon, 1985). Insiders may also 
intentionally trade on no information in order to disguise their trading on special information 
(Jaffe, 1974).  
Rozeff and Zaman (1988) assumed a two month reporting delay in their study as information 
usually takes some time to reach the market. They found that insiders are able to generate 
an average abnormal return of 3%-3.5% per annum after a 2% transaction cost is imposed. 
However, any profits earned by outsiders are non-existent after transaction costs. The 
assumption of 2% transaction costs are relatively low and should it be higher, the abnormal 
return will be even less. Dickgiesser and Kaserer (2010) examined the German market during 
the 2002- 2007 period; only since 2002 did it become mandatory to report insider trades in 
this market. They found that markets adjusted slowly to insider trades which are as a result 
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of high arbitrage risk causing prices to adjust steadily if there are weak arbitrage forces. Their 
results also show that transaction costs decrease abnormal returns earned. Ben David and 
Roulstone (2010) in their US study of covering the period 1986 to 2006 and Dickgiesser and 
Kaserer (2010), found that stocks with high idiosyncratic risk have a bigger abnormal return 
than stocks with low arbitrage risk. A study by Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey (1997) reported an 
abnormal return to outsiders of 6% for a holding period of 26 weeks.  Givoly and Palmon 
(1985) estimated abnormal returns of 8.0% over an 8-month holding period to outsiders. The 
greater abnormal returns found in their study could be partially due to the fact that their 
sample consisted of fairly small AMEX-listed companies. They suggest that exploitation by 
insiders is more likely when disclosure is optional such as management forecasts, disclosure 
of future plans, etc. than when disclosure is more obligatory e.g., earnings reports or 
dividends announcement. Gu and Li (2007) found that voluntary disclosure by managers 
proved to be a useful sign of credibility to outsiders in the US during the 1992 to 1994 period 
they studied.   
Hotson, Kaur and Singh (2007) find that directors’ trades are less profitable in the short run, 
e.g. one month than over the longer term i.e. in 90 or 160 days in their study of the Australian 
market during July to December 2005. Dardas and Guttler (2011) and Fidrmuc et al (2006) 
only examine abnormal returns over short holding periods of 20 days and 5 days respectively. 
The rest of the prior studies examined both short and long holding period returns. Fidrmuc et 
al (2006) found abnormal returns of 1.65% and – 0.49% for buys and sales respectively after 
a 5 day holding period. Ajlouni and Toms (2008) examine abnormal returns with a holding 
period up to 60 days and found that after 12 days, abnormal returns of 2.84 % could be earned 
for purchases and -3.43% for sales. After a 52 week holding period, Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey 
(1997) found abnormal returns for buy transactions were 11.67% and sale transactions were 
8.52%. Klinge, Seifert and Stehle (2005) studied German trades during the 2000-2002 period 
with holding periods of up to 100 days and found bigger abnormal returns when considering 
non-overlapping observations. 
When companies are in financial distress, their insider sales are seen as an added negative 
signal Dickgiesser and Kaserer (2010). Fidrmuc et al (2006) suggest that insider trading signals 
are less sensitive to firms in a stronger financial condition. Fidrmuc et al. (2010) also found 
that market reaction to insider purchases is larger in countries with good corporate 
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governance. Their study covered the 2002 to 2007 period and drew on data from the US and 
various European countries.  
Rozeff and Zaman (1998) propose a few hypotheses. When market prices deviate from 
fundamental values randomly across all types of stocks, this phenomenon is called the 
random hypothesis.  The overreaction hypothesis is where outsiders overvalue growth stocks 
and undervalue value stocks. The holdings hypothesis proposes that executives in low CF/P 
firms generally have larger share holdings which results in more stock sales than in high CF/P 
categories. They find that insider transactions are not random across growth and value stocks. 
Their results show that insider buying increases as stocks change from growth to value 
categories. Insider buying is also shown to be higher after low stock returns, and lower after 
high stock returns. Eckbo and Smith (1998) estimated returns of insider trades on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange over the period 1985 to 1992 and found negative abnormal performance and 
show that on average insiders do not outperform the average mutual fund. 
Seyhun (1992) examined US data covering 1975 to 1989 and defined aggregate insider trading 
as the sum of insider transactions at each point in time across all firms. If the mispricing is 
across the market, then aggregate insider trading will predict future market profits. They 
found that insiders in aggregate will buy stock when current prices are too low. On the other 
hand, when current prices are too high, insiders in aggregate will sell stock. However, if 
mispricing is firm specific, then each company’s insider transactions will cancel out, and 
aggregate insider trading should not predict future market returns. Their evidence suggests 
that changes in business circumstances and movements away from fundamentals add to the 
information content of aggregate insider trading.  
Fidrmuc et al (2006) found differences in regulation between the UK and US. The larger 
abnormal returns in the UK could be due to the speedier reporting of trades. Directors’ trades 
in the UK are seen to be more informative and thus may result in bigger market reactions 
than in the US. In the US, insiders only have to report their trades within the first 10 days of 
the month after the month of the trade (Fidrmuc et al, 2006). In the UK, however, directors 
must report their trades as soon as possible and by the fifth business day after their own 
transaction or on behalf of their spouses and children.  Given the shorter period for 
announcement of trades in the UK they expect insider trades in the UK to be more informative 
compared to the stale information received in the US.  
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Hsieh, Ng and Wang (2005) compared US insider trades to financial analyst recommendations 
over the 1994 to 2003 period and found that insiders’ trading activities and financial analysts’ 
recommendations had opposing information signals. They found that insiders trade against 
the analyst recommendations. When analysts have a negative view of a share, insiders tend 
to buy more of it than when they are recommended. Surprisingly, they found that analyst’s 
recommendations were not revised after insider trades.  
Many prior studies including Jaffe (1974) analysed intensive trading months, which is the 
difference between the number of buyers and sellers. Rozeff and Zaman (1988) use an 
intensive trading criterion which only classifies a buy if at least three insiders buy the stock in 
that month and if no insiders sell it. The criterion for a sell is if at least three insiders sell the 
stock and no insiders buy it. This is an attempt to isolate trades truly based on insider 
information as opposed to other reasons such as diversification.  
2.4 South African Studies on Directors’ Trading 
 
Directors of South African companies were only required to disclose their company dealings 
from 2 October 2002 (JSE Securities Listing Requirements, 2000). As a result there were not 
many studies done on this topic until more recent years.  In South Africa, insider trades 
become public only once it has been announced on SENS. Directors can only trade in their 
company’s securities once it has been cleared by the chairperson or other director (JSE 
Securities Listing Requirements, 2000). They are also not allowed to trade during certain 
closed periods and when there is material unpublished information available. Directors have 
to disclose their trades to the JSE within 24 hours. In comparison to the UK and US, insider 
trading in South Africa can thus be seen to be more informative and likely to trigger a bigger 
market reaction as the information is reported fresh after the trade date.  
Nair (2010) examined JSE data from 2002 to 2008 and found that South African directors earn 
much lower abnormal returns than international counterparts. Although Nair looked at the 
top 100 ALSI companies, a few exclusions were taken into account which reduced the sample 
to 72 companies. Exclusions included amongst others, option trades, restructuring 
transactions, sales followed by purchase of single stock futures, sale and purchase 
transactions that had a net effect of zero and only the first trading day of each week was 
considered (Nair,2010). Nair’s study consisted of 1439 transactions which resulted in 
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significant abnormal returns for purchase and sale transactions. Purchase transactions 
resulted in immediate positive abnormal returns before going into a negative return until the 
end of the holding period. This was in contrast to international studies which showed a 
positive abnormal return. A reason for this difference could be due to Nair only using the first 
trading day of the week, which might be an opposite direction to trades in the rest of the 
week. Abnormal returns for sales were negative for the first 47 days before they became 
positive until the end of the holding period. Although this result is similar to international 
studies, the magnitude of abnormal returns is much lower. Single director transactions were 
found to be mostly positive returns throughout the event period. Multiple buy transactions 
showed negative returns in the first few days, positive in the middle period and a strong 
negative abnormal return throughout most of the holding period. Multiple sales, however, 
had a few days of positive returns and a consistent negative return until the end of the event 
window.  
Moodley (2013) used a portfolio time series approach to study director dealings on the JSE 
between 2002 to 2013. An experimental approach using a style engine was used to find the 
optimal buy and sell investment style. This optimal style was then tested to see if the returns 
were larger than the benchmark. The results suggest that outsiders should buy when directors 
buy and also buy when directors sell.  
Mordant and Muller (2003) examined JSE data over the 2000 to 2002 period and found that 
directors can earn significant abnormal returns by trading in their companies’ shares. Most of 
the abnormal returns earned by directors were due to market effects such as size, value and 
resources. When these effects are removed, abnormal returns become fairly insignificant. 
They discovered that directors earn greater abnormal returns from their sales than buy 
purchases. This differs to the international studies, which could possibly be due to fewer sales 
through share option purchase transactions in their sample. Their study also differs in that 
returns are weighted by initial purchase or sale value as opposed to equally weighted, 
although the authors indicate that they are uncertain of the full implications of this 
adjustment on the robustness of the analysis The value of sales transactions were higher than 
purchases and therefore a greater weighting was placed on sales trades and their 
performance would be higher. They found no evidence that outsiders can earn abnormal 
returns by copying directors’ trades. Their study started in 2000 which was when directors 
13 
 
were required to start disclosing their dealings, therefore it could be possible that in the first 
few months not all trades were disclosed due to the newness of the process.  
Mordant and Muller (2003) and Nair (2010) both examined directors trades with holding 
periods from 1 day to 1 year. After 5 days, Mordant and Muller (2003) discovered abnormal 
returns of 0.6% for buys, compared to 0.33% by Nair (2010). For sales, Mordant and Muller 
(2003) found abnormal returns of 1.99% and Nair (2010) calculated - 0.11% to be the 
abnormal return after 5 days.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Below is a summary of the prior research investigated. All the studies show significant 
abnormal returns by directors, besides the study by Eckbo and Smith (1998).   
Generally, purchases produced a greater abnormal return than sales and higher transaction 
sizes also resulted in a higher abnormal return. The consensus suggests that multiple buys 
makes no difference compared to single buys, but multiple sales resulted in higher abnormal 
returns than single sales.  
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3. DATA 
 
The following section describes the collection of data, sample selection and sorting criteria 
implemented. 
3.1 Data Sample 
 
The sample used consisted of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) top 100 share data over the 
period 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2012. This was taken from a complete list of directors’ 
trades available on SENS from January 2007 to December 2012. Previous South African 
studies on directors trading all examined earlier data sets. We decided to exclude the 2007 to 
2008 period as this period’s returns would likely be skewed due to the effects of the financial 
crisis. The reason for the choice of top 100 companies by market capitalisation is that smaller 
companies have much lower market values and any big trades by directors cause a significant 
impact on results. In addition, smaller companies on the exchange are plagued by thin trading 
issues. Since the event study methodology applied for this study relies on daily data returns 
series, the presence of thin trading could significantly skew the analysis.  
Only ordinary shares were used. This study analyses actual purchases and shares by directors 
based on their expectation of future profits. Options were therefore excluded, as this would 
usually be for liquidity or diversification needs.  Similarly, linked units transactions were 
excluded from consideration. 
Our initial sample consisted of 590 transactions. We then removed any overlapping 
transactions, consistent with the majority of previous studies done. The use of overlapping 
data results in biases in CAAR calculations and thus test statistics. Single shares will be 
correlated if event windows are allowed to overlap, which affects the variance of the CAAR. 
However, if non-overlapping data is used, then there will be zero covariance between shares 
and the CAAR calculations won’t have any correlation concerns (Dardas and Güttler, 2011).  
We employed a 31-day window period representing 10 days prior to the transaction and 20 
days post the transaction.  Any share transaction that fell within 20 days of the window period 
of another transaction for the same share was therefore excluded. Our final sample, after 
removing overlapping transactions, consisted of 436 transactions. Data regarding the 
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transaction date, nature of the transaction (purchase vs. sale and direct beneficial vs. indirect 
beneficial) and value were all sourced. The sample was made up of 181 purchases and 255 
sale transactions. This sample size is considerably smaller than the study by Nair(2008), who 
had 315 purchases and 1124 sales. In comparison, Mordant and Muller (2003) had a total of 
2549 combined purchases and sales transactions. However, these studies did not exclude 
overlapping transactions. 
In South Africa, directors need to disclose the type of share dealing that they trade on. Direct 
beneficial trades are those where the security is registered in the name of the director and 
the director has voting rights over the security or the right to receive the dividends in respect 
thereof (JSE Securities Listing Requirements, 2000).  
Indirect beneficial trades are those where the security is not registered in the name of the 
director but rather through a trust or an investment holding company in which the director 
holds any or all of the voting rights and/or is a beneficiary of the trust (JSE Securities Listing 
Requirements, 2000). 
Any non-beneficial transactions in the sample were removed from this specific test as it was 
not felt that they would provide a definite signal to the market regarding a director’s 
intentions with regard to the transaction. 
The relevant data is summarized in the table below. 
Table 3.1: Summary of Directors Dealings Data 
Type of 
Transaction 
Total 
Direct 
Beneficial 
Indirect 
Beneficial 
Average Transaction 
Size 
Single 
Director 
Transactions 
Multiple 
Director 
Transactions 
Purchases 181 120 601  R           4 622 818.77  145 36 
Sales 255 207 48  R           5 762 719.95  220 35 
Total 436 327 108   365 71 
 
Sample data comprising of the daily total returns (comprising both dividends and price 
changes) of the top 100 companies listed on the JSE and daily total return index values of the 
All Share Index (ALSI) were also found. It should be noted that the constituents of the top 100 
companies are fluid as the JSE rebalances its indices on a quarterly basis. As such, any share 
                                                          
1 One indirect non-beneficial transaction removed from purchases sample. 
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that fell in the top 100 at any point over the sample period (even for just one quarter) was 
included in the data sample. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of this paper is to determine whether buy and sell transactions by corporate insiders 
send signals which could indicate expectations regarding company performance. As event 
studies determine the behaviour of firms share prices around corporate events, this method 
was chosen as the most appropriate. Event studies are a way of testing for market inefficiency 
as abnormal returns that continue after a corporate event are not consistent with market 
efficiency (Kothari and Warner, 2006). The size of abnormal performance at the time of an 
event provides a measure of the impact of the event studied on the wealth of the company’s 
claimholders (Kothari and Warner, 2006).  Short horizon event studies also provide evidence 
required for understanding corporate policy decisions.  
In order to perform an event study, the following steps are required: 
 Select a window period 
 Estimate a market model 
 Calculate the abnormal returns for each share in the sample using the market model 
 Aggregate these abnormal returns by finding an average for each day across all shares 
in the sample 
 Calculate a cumulative average abnormal return in order to measure the incremental 
abnormal return across the sample for all events of that type 
 Test if the cumulative average abnormal return is significantly different from zero 
4.1 The Event Study Window Period 
 
We conducted an event study using a 31 day window period (days -10 to +20). The directors’ 
transaction date (time t) is specified as day 0, with the event window extending 10 days prior 
to announcement (-10) and 20 days post announcement (+20).  
The window periods were chosen to allow for examination of the impact of the transactions 
both prior to and post the event. Short –horizon window periods have been shown to be more 
reliable as they are well specified, are a powerful method if the abnormal performance is 
concentrated in the event window and the test statistic is not very sensitive to the 
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assumptions about the return generating process as can be found with long horizon methods 
(Kothari and Warner, 2006).   
4.2 Estimating Returns Using the Market Model 
 
The market model was used to estimate the expected returns of the shares over a certain 
period. The CAPM, is an equilibrium model stating that the expected returns on an asset are 
linearly related to the assets exposure to market risk, as measured by beta.  
Jaffe (1974) and Finnerty (1976) use variants of the CAPM to estimate abnormal returns to 
securities. Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) found that CAPM based residuals were on 
average positive for small firms, and negative for large firms. This leads to biases in estimating 
abnormal returns due to the bias in CAPM residuals. Thus many later studies used the APT 
model to avoid the CAPM biases.  
In unreported results, it was found that there was little significant difference in the results 
from our analysis when using the CAPM and APT models. This is consistent with the findings 
for an unrelated event study using JSE data conducted by Kruger and Toerien (2014). For 
purposes of brevity and simplicity, we therefore work with and report on only the CAPM 
results. 
The market model uses an estimation period, which is the period before the event window 
that is used to estimate the parameters for calculation of the normal returns. An estimation 
period of 220 days was used to estimate the market model for each share in the sample.  Most 
prior studies used an estimation window of between 180 to 250 days and this period ensured 
that there would be no overlap with window periods 
The CAPM model is given by: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            (1.1) 
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Where: 
 Ri,t : the daily price returns of share i at time t 
RALSI: the daily price returns of the ALSI at time t 
αi,t : the alpha for share i, 
βi,t : the beta for share i,  
εi,t:  the abnormal return 
The above model was used to regress each share during the estimation period to find the 
expected return equation for that share. We then used this equation to estimate what the 
normal return should be during the event window period. The abnormal return was then 
calculated as the difference between the actual return and the normal return for each share.  
The abnormal returns for each share were then averaged across each time period.   
     AARt =
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
               (1.2) 
where AARt denotes the average abnormal return at time t, N indicates the number of 
director transactions in the sample and ARi,t is the abnormal return for share i at time t. This 
was done to average out the firm-specific elements of return that may still be present in the 
abnormal return. What should remain is the element that is common to all share windows – 
the event in question. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are calculated over the event window for both 
directors’ purchase and sales transactions.  
                                         𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖 (0,𝑡) = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=0
          (1.3) 
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where CAAR i (0,t) is the cumulative average abnormal return for each share i included in the 
sample over t days of trade.  
4.3 Tests of Significance 
The statistical significance of the CAARs for each share is computed using a t-test with the 
following test statistic: 
 𝑡𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 =  𝑁
−1 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖  𝑠(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅)
√𝑁
⁄
𝑁
𝑖=1                                               (1.4) 
where s(CAAR) is the standard deviation of the cumulative average abnormal returns and N 
is the number of director transactions in the sample.   
The null hypothesis for each test states that the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) 
of directors trades is not significantly different from zero. The alternative hypothesis thus 
states that the CAAR of directors’ trades is significantly different from zero. A two sided t-test 
was done at the 5% significance level, as we were interested in any positive or negative 
abnormal returns. 
H0 : CAARt = 0 
H1 : CAARt ≠ 0  
 
In order to isolate the impact of various factors on the director’s transactions, the sample was 
split according to various criteria and the above methodology applied to each sub-sample as 
discussed below. 
4. 4 Data Sub - Samples  
 
Transactions were split and sorted into the following categories:  
4.4.1 Purchases and Sales 
 
In order to examine the differences in the impact of purchases and sales transactions on 
abnormal returns for shares in the sample, the full data sample was first split into purchases 
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and sales transactions. A number of events in the sample comprised multiple transactions by 
more than one director on the same day and there was a concern that including all such 
transactions in the analysis would skew the results towards such events. In order to avoid 
multiple director’s transactions on the same event day skewing the analysis, only the first 
transaction for each company on a given event day was included in the samples in question. 
4.4.2 Direct and Indirect Beneficial Trades 
 
Transactions were then split into direct and indirect beneficial trades for each of the 
purchases and sales. This resulted in four additional samples for testing – Direct Beneficial 
Purchases, Indirect Beneficial Purchases, Direct Beneficial Sales and Indirect Beneficial Sales. 
4.4.3 Transaction Size 
 
The original sales and purchases samples were then divided into the top, middle and lower 
third transactions according to size. Anything that fell in the top third category was considered 
high value and anything that fell into the lower third of transaction values was considered low 
value. Thus all values in the middle category were excluded. The high and low values were 
separately tested for abnormal returns, for both purchases and sales, resulting in four more 
samples – High Value Purchases, Low Value Purchases, High Value Sales and Low Value Sales. 
4.4.4 Single and Multiple Transactions 
 
Finally, the original transactions samples were split into single and multiple transactions. 
Single transactions occurred where only one director traded on each share’s trade date in our 
sample. Multiple transactions occurred where more than one director traded. This was done 
for purchases and sales separately, as above, resulting in four samples – Single Purchases, 
Multiple Purchases, Single Sales and Multiple Sales.  
The split in data samples is summarized below: 
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Table 4.1: Breakdown of Sample Selection 
Year Transactions Purchases Sales 
Direct 
Beneficial  
Indirect 
Beneficial 
Avg. Purchase 
Size 
Avg. Sale Size 
Single 
Director 
Transactions 
Multiple 
Director 
Transactions 
2009                 98  52 
           
46  73             25   R 1,054,788.24   R 5,038,786.89  75 23 
2010 58 32 26 42 16  R 4,679,924.88   R 2,838,538.42  45 13 
2011 108 38 70 83 242  R 1,405,984.98   R 5,900,198.07  88 20 
2012 172 59 113 129 43  R 9,808,409.91   R 6,645,075.45  157 15 
2009-
2012 436 181 255 327 108  R 4,237,277.00   R 5,105,649.71  365 71 
 
From Table 4.1 above it can be seen that over the four year period there were generally more 
sales than buy transactions and the average transaction size was also higher for sales. The 
South African study by Nair (2008) also consisted of more sales transactions than purchases, 
with sales accounting for 78% of the sample. However, most of the international studies had 
a higher number of purchases to sales, but the average transaction size for sales was higher. 
Directors have a really good reason when they sell, and if due to poor expectation, they would 
withdraw as much of their investment as possible to avoid losses. Most of the transactions 
were directly beneficial as expected, because directors are more actively involved in the 
company. There was a huge spike in transaction volume and average purchases size in 2012. 
During 2012, the JSE was on a rise, which could explain the higher volume, particularly for 
purchases. Lastly, the majority of the trades on a given day were by a single director as shown 
by Nair (2008) as well. Single director transactions are thus more evident as, for sale trades, 
reasons for selling are usually director specific. Multiple transactions will be more prevalent 
when a clear consensus on expectation is found.  
4. 5 Shortcomings of Event Studies 
 
Although the event study methodology is the most appropriate for the nature of this study, 
it has a few limitations.  
Firstly, there is the problem of the joint test for event studies whether abnormal returns are  
                                                          
2 One indirect non-beneficial transaction removed from 2011 sample. 
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zero and if the market model used is correct. The choice of market model used is therefore 
an important consideration. This study used the CAPM model as was used by many of the 
earlier studies. 
Secondly, long horizon returns tend to be right-skewed. This creates skewness in the bias of 
the test statistic. Therefore, this study used a short horizon event window. Thirdly, 
specification bias from cross-correlation in returns remains a serious issue. We overcame 
this bias by using a short horizon as this bias is more evident in long horizon event studies. 
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5. RESULTS  
 
This chapter discusses the empirical findings of the study. Results are summarised for each of 
the sub-samples the data was sorted into, as per Section 4.4. 
5.1 Purchases vs. Sales 
 
CAARs for the sample of purchases and sales are graphically depicted below in Figures 1 and 
2.  
5.1.1 Purchases 
 
 
Figure 1: CAARs for Purchases 
 
CAARs for purchases decline and remain negative from 10 days before the event until event 
day, reaching -0.6% on event day. They then start increasing and reach a maximum of 0.51% 
on day 9 after which they start decreasing. By day 20 they have stabilised close to 0. Directors 
seem to purchase shares at very low values on day 0, which then climbs steeply suggesting 
that they purchase stock before the release of favourable information. The negative returns 
prior to the event, suggests that they tend to refrain from purchasing stock until after 
unfavourable information is released. Abnormal returns are high post event date, possibly 
due to an increase in market sentiment as a result of directors apparent faith in future 
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earnings of their company. This positive sentiment persists for almost two weeks following 
the trades before the markets start adjusting back to normality and abnormal returns become 
closer to 0. As the SENS announcement is usually a few days after the event date, abnormal 
returns only become positive from day 3 onwards. Possible reasons for insiders buying are 
because they see great future potential, the share is undervalued or possible M&A activity. 
The CAARs for purchases are slightly higher than those found by Nair (2010). From the above 
graph, a CAAR of 0.49% is found after 10 days, whereas Nair (2010) found 0.28%.  
 
 5.1.2 Sales 
 
 
Figure 2: CAARs for Sales 
 
For the sales transactions, abnormal returns are mostly positive throughout the event 
window although there is a clear negative trend after the event day. We see a sharp increase 
in CAARs over the 10 days prior to the event, reaching a maximum of 1.18% the day before 
the event. From day -1 returns start declining until the end of the event window where it 
approaches 0. Directors thus sell at the highest value prior to the release of unfavourable 
information. They also refrain from selling until after favourable information is released. The 
sharp increase before event day suggests directors had insightful information prior to their 
trade as they traded when share prices were at their highest. The decline after event day can 
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be explained by the negative market sentiment by investors after seeing directors sell shares 
in their company which they could see as a distress signal. This brings prices down. It must be 
remembered that the data sample was filtered to exclude inconsequential transactions such 
as director’s reorganising their portfolios or exercising options and so these sales transactions 
are likely to send a strong signal to the market.  
For sales, abnormal returns decrease after the event day, compared to the increase seen by 
purchases. Contrary to expectations, director sales cause a higher market reaction than 
purchases. We expect sales to have a lower reaction because of the various reasons directors 
sell other than just expectation of poor future earnings. However, CAARs are much higher for 
sales than purchases during the event period. Directors are rational investors who sell at what 
they believe to be the highest share value. They are thus selling strategically to avoid future 
losses when the share price declines. The CAARs for sales are higher than those found by Nair 
(2010). After 10 days, a CAAR of 0.42% is found above and Nair (2010) found 0.31% when 
their sales multiplication by -1 is ignored.  
Table 5.1: Director Purchases and Sales - Significance of CAARs 
Purchases Sample 
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to 0 -0.59% -8.10 Significant 
Day 0 to 9 0.97% 1.82 Not Significant 
Day 9 to 20 -0.54% 2.29 Significant 
        
Sales Sample 
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to -1 1.18% 4.72 Significant 
Day -1 to 20 -1.10% 7.26 Significant 
        
 
CAARs for director purchases are not significant for the 9 days after the event. From days 9 to 
20 the decline in CAARs are significant. Returns for director sales are highly significant at the 
5% significant level throughout the event period.   
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5.2  Direct vs. Indirect Beneficial Trades 
5.2.1 Purchases 
 
 
Figure 3: CAARs –Direct vs Indirect Purchases 
 
The graphs of the CAARs for both directly and indirectly beneficial purchases largely mirror 
the graph for the combined sample of all purchase transactions. Abnormal returns are 
negative for the 10 days prior to the event for both directly and indirectly beneficial 
purchases. For directly beneficial purchases, a sharp increase is seen on day -1, whereas for 
indirect beneficial, a sharp increase is seen on day +2. Returns for indirectly beneficial 
purchases increase till about day 6 when they reach their maximum and then start stabilising 
before decreasing again. Returns for directly beneficial trades flatten out at about day 4, 
which might be due to new market information and thus the reaction of the director’s trade 
phasing out. From day 13, returns start their decline back to zero.  Abnormal returns of 
indirect beneficial trades are generally larger which is contradictory to our expectation of 
greater reaction to directly beneficial trades which are done for the director’s personal 
benefit. A reason for the lower returns of directly beneficial trades could be due to the 
awareness that directors have of their trades being closely watched, thus they are cautious in 
their insider trades.  
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Table 5.2: Directly and Indirectly Beneficial Purchases - Significance of CAARs 
Directly Beneficial Purchases 
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to -1 -0.59% -5.51 Significant 
Day -1 to 5 0.79% 0.02 Not Significant 
Day 5 to 20 -0.45% 5.51 Significant 
        
Indirectly Beneficial Purchases 
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to 2 -0.60% -5.79 Significant 
Day 2 to 6 1.01% 1.03 Not Significant 
Day 6 to 20 -0.95% 1.56 Not Significant 
 
No meaningful deductions can be made for directly beneficial returns immediately after the 
event date as the results are insignificant. The market assumes less insider knowledge 
associated with the director’s purchase. However, returns are significant from day 5 to 20.    
Abnormal returns of indirect beneficial trades are more volatile, with the only significant 
return being on days -10 to 2.  
5.2.2 Sales 
 
 
Figure 4: CAARs –Direct vs Indirect Sales 
 
Interestingly, only the directly beneficial sales sample demonstrates CAARs similar to that of 
the overall sales sample. The indirectly beneficial sales sample has a markedly different CAAR 
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profile.  Direct beneficial sales’ abnormal returns increase from days -10 until -1 and then start 
decreasing from day -1 until the end of the event window. Abnormal returns from indirect 
beneficial sales remain negative until day -6 when they start increasing until the end of the 
event window. Day -1 is when abnormal returns of directly beneficial trades are the highest 
at 1.34% and start their decline throughout the rest of the event window. Prior to this, CAARs 
experience a sharp increase from day -10. There is no clear trend in the indirectly beneficial 
graph as returns seem to increase and decrease randomly. Indirectly beneficial shares are 
being sold when the stock market is on the rise, which is irrational and could indicate that 
these trades are not executed with sufficient knowledge to be able to time the trades. From 
days -10 to 0, there is an increasing positive return on direct sales, which is as a result of the 
share price increasing. Directors thus wait till the share price is at its highest on day -1 before 
selling.  
Table 5.3: Directly and Indirectly Beneficial Sales - Significance of CAARs 
Directly Beneficial Sales 
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to 0 1.18% 5.75 Significant 
Day 0 to 20 -1.58% 5.00 Significant 
        
        
Indirectly Beneficial Sales 
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to 0 0.43% 0.96 Not Significant 
Day 0 to 20 0.42% 0.00 Significant 
        
 
Returns for directly beneficial sales trades are highly significant at the 5% significant level 
throughout the event period.   
Indirect sales do not directly involve the director and thus less market emphasis is placed on 
these trades, resulting in no significant effect during days -10 to 0. However, results for 
indirectly beneficial sales are significant from day 0 to 20. 
 
5.3  Transaction Size – Low vs. High 
 
5.3.1 Purchases 
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Figure 5: CAARs –High vs Low Transaction Size Purchases 
Abnormal returns for high purchase values remain positive and stable until event day when 
they start increasing. For low transaction values, however, the abnormal returns are negative 
and start decreasing from the event day. Low transaction values seem to have a converse 
effect, by incurring a decreasing negative abnormal return after the event day. The market 
thus has a negative market reaction to low valued purchases. The market sees large buys as 
a credible signal, resulting in positive abnormal returns. We expect the market to have a 
strong reaction to higher valued purchases as the more capital directors are committing, the 
greater risk they are taking on which means they should be expecting substantial reward to 
compensate for this.  
Table 5.4: High Value vs Low Value Purchases - Significance of CAARs 
High Value Purchases  
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to 1 0.19% 7.71 Significant 
Day 1 to 7 1.51% 5.58 Significant 
Day 7 to 20 -0.22% 30.52 Significant 
        
Low Value Purchases  
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to 0 -1.23% -5.46 Significant 
Day 0 to 20 -0.41% -23.94 Significant 
    
 
High and low sized purchases results are statistically significant throughout the event 
period. 
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5.3.2 Sales 
 
 
Figure 6: CAARs – High vs Low Transaction Size Sales 
Low transaction valued sales increase from days -10 to -1 and they then start decreasing. They 
experience a sharp decrease from day -1 to +1. High transaction values increase until the 
event day when they start slightly stabilising.  
If directors are selling due to company performance, they could disguise this by having a few 
smaller transactions as opposed to one big transaction which might be an alarm signal to the 
market. Therefore, this will be classified as low transaction values, but will in fact be one large 
trade by a director. As discussed by Givoly and Palmon (1985), low value transactions could 
merely be for liquidity needs whereas large values could be based on company performance 
expectations.   
Table 5.5: High Value vs Low Value Sales - Significance of CAARs 
High Value Sales 
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to 0 1.10% 3.92 Significant 
Day 0 to 20 -0.38% 17.98 Significant 
        
        
Low Value Sales 
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to 1 0.37% 5.83 Significant 
Day 1 to 20 -1.38% 1.64 Not Significant 
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High sales returns are significant after the event date whereas for low sales they are 
insignificant. 
5.4   Single vs. Multiple Transactions 
5.4.1 Purchases 
 
 
Figure 7: CAARs –Single vs Multiple Transactions Purchases 
Single director purchases result in negative abnormal returns until the event day when it 
starts increasing until about day 8 when it starts to stabilise. For multiple transactions, 
however, they also start increasing on event day reaching a maximum on day 4, then declining 
to a considerable negative return on day 20. A theory to note is that if many directors trade, 
this could in fact be purchasing shares when the company is doing poorly, just to reassure the 
market that they are doing well (Givoly and Palmon, 1985).  
Multiple buy transactions are not expected to add further credibility to a purchase, as 
purchases are usually only for one reason which is to make a profit, and a single directors 
purchase can be seen as a large enough signal. A single buy is thus seen as assurance enough, 
not required to be followed by other directors before the public sees this as a signal.  
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Table 5.6: Single vs Multiple Purchases - Significance of CAARs 
Single Purchases  
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to 0 -0.62% -7.52 Significant 
Day 0 to 7 1.19% 1.18 Not Significant 
Day 7 to 20 -0.40% 7.73 Significant 
        
Multiple Purchases  
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to 0 -0.46% -3.66 Significant 
Day 0 to 4 0.33% 0.13 Not Significant 
Day 4 to 20 -1.71% -3.74 Significant 
 
For the first few days after the event, both single and multiple transactions are insignificant.  
5.4.2 Sales  
 
 
Figure 8: CAARs –Single vs Multiple Sales 
The behaviour of single and multiple trades are similar throughout until day 13 when they 
move in opposite directions, with single transactions declining and multiple increasing at this 
point. Prior to this, returns increased until day -1, they then decreased till about announced 
day. As previously discussed, director sales are not necessarily any representation of company 
performance, but usually for personal reasons. However, if many directors sell at the same 
time, this is a clearer signal of expectation of negative company perception. A single director 
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selling is most likely for personal needs, and multiple directors selling are likely a sign of bad 
expectations.  
Table 5.7: Single vs Multiple Sales - Significance of CAARs 
Single Sales 
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to -1 1.31% 4.82 Significant 
Day -1 to 20 -1.25% 6.43 Significant 
        
        
Multiple Sales  
Period CAAR Test Statistic Significant at 5% level 
Day -10 to -1 0.66% 2.18 Significant 
Day -1 to 20 0.06% 14.73 Significant 
        
 
Sales transactions are significant before and after the event for single and multiple trades.  
5.5  Summary 
The following table summarises the transaction types that had the greatest effect on 
abnormal returns earned.  
Table 5.8: Comparison of Market Reaction to Sample Selections 
Sample Comparison Greater Market Reaction/Abnormal Return 
Purchases vs Sales Purchases 
Directly/Indirectly beneficial Purchases Indirectly beneficial 
Directly/Indirectly beneficial Sales Indirectly beneficial 
High/ Low value Purchases High Value 
High/ Low value Sales High Value 
Single/Multiple Director Purchases Single 
Single/Multiple Director Sales Multiple 
 
The table below summarises the cumulative abnormal returns and statistical significance of 
the various sub samples. 
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Table 5.9: Summary of CAAR and Significance of Results 
 
SAMPLE CAAR TEST STATISTIC SIGNIFICANCE 
        
Overall Purchases       
Day -10 to 0 -0.59% -8.10 Significant 
Day 0 to 9 0.97% 1.82 Not Significant 
Day 9 to 20 -0.54% 2.29 Significant 
        
Overall Sales       
Day -10 to -1 1.18% 4.72 Significant 
Day -1 to 20 -1.10% 7.26 Significant 
        
Directly Beneficial Purchases       
Day -10 to -1 -0.59% -5.51 Significant 
Day -1 to 5 0.79% 0.02 Not Significant 
Day 5 to 20 -0.45% 5.51 Significant 
        
Indirectly Beneficial Purchases       
Day -10 to 2 -0.60% -5.79 Significant 
Day 2 to 6 1.01% 1.03 Not Significant 
Day 6 to 20 -0.95% 1.56 Not Significant 
        
Directly Beneficial Sales       
Day -10 to 0 1.18% 5.75 Significant 
Day 0 to 20 -1.58% 5.00 Significant 
        
Indirectly Beneficial Sales       
Day -10 to 0 0.43% 0.96 Not Significant 
Day 0 to 20 0.42% 0.00 Significant 
        
High Valued Purchases       
Day -10 to 1 0.19% 7.71 Significant 
Day 1 to 7 1.51% 5.58 Significant 
Day 7 to 20 -0.22% 30.52 Significant 
        
Low Valued Purchases       
Day -10 to 0 -1.23% -5.46 Significant 
Day 0 to 20 -0.41% -23.94 Significant 
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High Valued Sales       
Day -10 to 0 1.10% 3.92 Significant 
Day 0 to 20 -0.38% 17.98 Significant 
        
Low Valued Sales       
Day -10 to 1 0.37% 5.83 Significant 
Day 1 to 20 -1.38% 1.64 Not Significant 
        
Single Purchases       
Day -10 to 0 -0.62% -7.52 Significant 
Day 0 to 7 1.19% 1.18 Not Significant 
Day 7 to 20 -0.40% 7.73 Significant 
        
Multiple Purchases       
Day -10 to 0 -0.46% -3.66 Significant 
Day 0 to 4 0.33% 0.13 Not Significant 
Day 4 to 20 -1.71% -3.74 Significant 
        
Single Sales       
Day -10 to -1 1.31% 4.82 Significant 
Day -1 to 20 -1.25% 6.43 Significant 
        
Multiple Sales       
Day -10 to -1 0.66% 2.18 Significant 
Day -1 to 20 0.06% 14.73 Significant 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Major Findings 
 
The results are consistent with the international studies suggesting that directors are 
contrarian.  We can see that they tend to purchase shares that are at their lowest values, right 
before the upswing. This is with the expectation that the price is on its way up and will result 
in future profits. It can be inferred that directors have the knowledge to be able to time this 
purchase strategically. They also sell at the highest values, just before the prices go down. Our 
results differ to international studies which majority found purchases to be a higher signal. 
The South African study by Mordant and Muller (2003) found similar results to ours, in which 
sales transactions have the higher abnormal returns. SA directors are thus seen to be better 
at selling out of share positions before a decline in performance, as opposed to buying before 
a rise in share prices.  
Indirectly beneficial transactions appear to hold more information content than those that 
are direct, which is contrary to ones thoughts that these are for the director’s own personal 
holdings and should therefore be more indicative of their beliefs about the company’s 
prospects. This effect was more pronounced for the sales transactions as purchases 
transactions seemed to create volatile but larger market reactions to indirectly beneficial 
trades. 
High transaction values seem to provide a significantly higher signal than do low values, 
especially for sales.  
When multiple directors sell, there appears to be a stronger market reaction than when a 
single director does. Single purchases, however, are seen as a stronger signal than multiple 
purchases.  
For most of the samples we find the market reacts around the trade date, although the trade 
only gets reported on average a day or two after.  This is consistent with the findings of 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who suggest that information about directors trades might leak to 
the market before the reporting date. 
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Directors are in a fortunate position to be able to identify underpriced or overpriced shares 
and thus time their purchases and sales with the hope of future market correction. Insider 
trading seems to contribute to market efficiency as outsiders identify the informational signal 
and follow with subsequent trades. The market is generally slow to react and only fully adjusts 
after 20 days, indicating a measure of inefficiency in processing information. Abnormal 
returns earned from directors’ trades are significantly smaller than those of international 
studies. Directors’ trades should be used as a supplement to other trading strategies and not 
be the sole motivation for trading.  
 
6.2 Limitations of Study 
 
 This study is limited to large companies by examining the data of only the top 100 
companies on the JSE. . Large companies are priced more efficiently than small 
companies. The most likely way to explore insider trading activity is in smaller 
companies (Lakonishok and Lee). Future studies could examine all listed companies 
on the JSE.  
 Options purchases were excluded in this study as they are generally exercised at below 
market prices and thus not comparable to market returns (Mordant and Muller, 2003). 
Option sales were excluded as these were executed for liquidity and diversification; 
therefore they are not seen as informative. Further studies should look at options as 
well.  
 The data filtering process removed overlapping periods. During this process a number 
of transactions are removed which could have altered the results had they been 
included. A comparison could be done with overlapping and non-overlapping periods 
to see if any significant differences arise.  
 A short horizon event window period was used of 31 days. Some previous studies used 
long horizons and found abnormal returns for extended periods of time. This could be 
implemented on this study as well.  
 This study could be extended to include other investment criteria such as the price to 
book ratios, price/earnings multiples and dividend yields.  
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 As discussed in this paper, the CAPM does come with a few biases. Future studies 
could look at alternative models such as the APT model and adjusting for market 
effects such as size and value.  
 A further suggestion is to include transaction costs in the calculation of abnormal 
returns.  
The above factors could build on the existing study in attempting to more accurately assess 
directors’ abnormal returns. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Appendix A1 –Directors Dealings Purchases Data 
 
Ticker Date Type Value Single/Multiple 
ACP 1/14/2009 Direct Beneficial 81600 S 
GRT 1/30/2009 Indirect Beneficial 2687360 S 
ACP 2/6/2009 Direct Beneficial 80.7 S 
WHL 2/23/2009 Direct Beneficial 115900 S 
SAP 3/10/2009 Direct Beneficial 107360 S 
WHL 3/16/2009 Direct Beneficial 27625 S 
RES 3/19/2009 Indirect Beneficial 209808 S 
DSY 3/25/2009 Indirect Beneficial 277841.15 S 
MDC 3/26/2009 Direct Beneficial 203912.94 M 
CPI 4/15/2009 Direct Beneficial 1536500 S 
DSY 4/17/2009 Indirect Beneficial 50350 S 
SAC 4/21/2009 Indirect Beneficial 315437.5 S 
DTC 5/15/2009 Direct Beneficial 49170 M 
WHL 5/25/2009 Direct Beneficial 196160 S 
MMI 5/26/2009 Indirect Beneficial 14089.92 S 
NTC 6/1/2009 Direct Beneficial 26160 S 
PIK 6/2/2009 Direct Beneficial 650000 S 
AMS 6/3/2009 Direct Beneficial 101514.3 S 
PAP 6/9/2009 Indirect Beneficial 675000 S 
RDF 6/10/2009 Direct Beneficial 307500 S 
DST 6/10/2009 Direct Beneficial 9052.5 S 
GRT 6/11/2009 Direct Beneficial 1331000 S 
SHF 6/12/2009 Direct Beneficial 23654.4 M 
APN 6/23/2009 Direct Beneficial 1763577.6 M 
RBW 6/23/2009 Direct Beneficial 212800 M 
VKE 6/25/2009 Indirect Beneficial 34905 S 
EMI 6/30/2009 Direct Beneficial 2026140 M 
ANG 8/4/2009 Direct Beneficial 1572498.9 S 
AMS 8/5/2009 Direct Beneficial 492000 S 
WHL 8/31/2009 Direct Beneficial 775717.8066 M 
SHP 9/2/2009 Indirect Beneficial 2820000 S 
CLH 9/3/2009 Direct Beneficial 3962572.87 M 
ILV 9/14/2009 Direct Beneficial 25613.25 M 
GRT 9/14/2009 Direct Beneficial 228448.94 S 
TBS 9/18/2009 Indirect Beneficial 798419 S 
AEG 9/18/2009 Direct Beneficial 6575992.8 M 
WHL 9/30/2009 Direct Beneficial 51520 S 
IPL 10/6/2009 Direct Beneficial 1859986.801 M 
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SUI 10/6/2009 Direct Beneficial 1519452.483 M 
SHF 10/26/2009 Indirect Beneficial 1892230 S 
GRT 10/27/2009 Indirect Beneficial 66358.6 S 
SHP 11/2/2009 Direct Beneficial 4263426.3 S 
IPL 11/3/2009 Indirect Beneficial 619200 S 
ACP 11/20/2009 Direct Beneficial 4811200 M 
NPK 11/23/2009 Direct Beneficial 26175.63 M 
FBR 11/30/2009 Direct Beneficial 484980 S 
SOL 12/4/2009 Direct Beneficial 89500 S 
ASA 12/4/2009 Direct Beneficial 126500 M 
SHP 12/4/2009 Indirect Beneficial 3143500 S 
TRU 12/11/2009 Direct Beneficial 1066250 S 
PFG 12/17/2009 Direct Beneficial 865000 S 
SHF 12/23/2009 Indirect Beneficial 3677946 M 
PFG 1/13/2010 Direct Beneficial 302750 S 
ILV 1/20/2010 Direct Beneficial 333718.8 S 
DTC 2/2/2010 Indirect Beneficial 276450 S 
DTC 2/8/2010 Indirect Beneficial 1509095 M 
TRU 2/19/2010 Direct Beneficial 20151000 M 
CML 2/19/2010 Direct Beneficial 6031480 M 
NPK 3/5/2010 Direct Beneficial 417497.349 M 
MSM 3/10/2010 Direct Beneficial 293700 S 
SOL 3/16/2010 Direct Beneficial 402750 S 
NED 3/18/2010 Direct Beneficial 1664700 S 
SHF 3/31/2010 Indirect Beneficial 6380224.8 S 
MSM 3/31/2010 Direct Beneficial 83337.3 S 
WHL 4/12/2010 Direct Beneficial 36624 S 
MSM 4/26/2010 Direct Beneficial 57435.56 S 
WHL 5/20/2010 Direct Beneficial 492350 S 
IMP 5/24/2010 Direct Beneficial 197100 S 
MSM 5/26/2010 Direct Beneficial 1292233.14 M 
SAC 5/26/2010 Indirect Beneficial 43689.25 S 
ILV 6/1/2010 Direct Beneficial 60060 S 
NTC 7/26/2010 Direct Beneficial 261600 S 
GFI 8/20/2010 Direct Beneficial 201021.8 S 
SHP 8/27/2010 Direct Beneficial 3294740.14 M 
ASA 9/9/2010 Direct Beneficial 11773.8 S 
MTX 9/10/2010 Indirect Beneficial 83610369.15 S 
BAT 9/14/2010 Indirect Beneficial 1037500 S 
WHL 9/20/2010 Direct Beneficial 64220 S 
SUI 9/30/2010 Direct Beneficial 263471.4735 M 
BVT 10/11/2010 Direct Beneficial 977500 S 
FSR 10/14/2010 Direct Beneficial 6898500 S 
SHP 11/22/2010 Indirect Beneficial 720090 S 
CLS 11/30/2010 Direct Beneficial 2441284.56 M 
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SHP 12/14/2010 Indirect Beneficial 9949330 S 
NTC 1/10/2011 Direct beneficial 342500 S 
NPK 1/20/2011 Direct beneficial 1657312.49 M 
LHC 1/31/2011 Direct beneficial 28173.67 S 
RDF 2/3/2011 Direct beneficial 46548.04 M 
RES 2/10/2011 Indirect beneficial 1512000 M 
PWK 2/18/2011 Indirect beneficial 13096921.8 M 
ASA 3/14/2011 Direct beneficial 4305488.88 S 
HLM 3/24/2011 Direct beneficial 48650 S 
ASA 4/7/2011 Direct beneficial 3886075.33 S 
RES 4/11/2011 Indirect beneficial 60280 S 
WHL 4/20/2011 Direct beneficial 2038393.93 S 
AMS 5/10/2011 Direct Beneficial 248400 S 
DTC 5/16/2011 Indirect beneficial 246749.58 S 
RES 5/17/2011 Direct beneficial 303000 S 
ABL 5/23/2011 Direct Beneficial 74806.68 S 
TFG 5/31/2011 Indirect beneficial 4958430 M 
BAT 6/3/2011 Indirect Beneficial 165000 S 
CPL 6/24/2011 Indirect beneficial 1467000 S 
TBS 8/2/2011 Direct beneficial 431655 S 
HLM 8/4/2011 Direct beneficial 41796 S 
RES 8/11/2011 Indirect beneficial 5735938.5 S 
CPL 8/11/2011 Indirect beneficial 26446.14 S 
WHL 8/25/2011 Direct Beneficial 164500 S 
SHP 8/26/2011 Direct beneficial 2111676.6 M 
ABL 9/1/2011 Indirect beneficial 344470 S 
LHC 9/6/2011 Indirect beneficial 339500 S 
RES 9/16/2011 Indirect beneficial 292282.7 S 
WHL 9/19/2011 Direct beneficial 2748.96 S 
HYP 9/28/2011 Direct beneficial 847800 S 
SUI 10/3/2011 Direct beneficial 1272057.74 M 
LHC 10/3/2011 Indirect beneficial 350079 S 
RES 11/3/2011 Indirect beneficial 2319611.4 S 
SYC 11/17/2011 Direct beneficial 99521 S 
RES 12/9/2011 Indirect beneficial 335.1 S 
VKE 12/9/2011 
Indirect non-
beneficial 829163.07 S 
SHF 12/12/2011 Direct beneficial 1227500 S 
CLS 12/12/2011 Direct beneficial 2264617.6 M 
SIM 12/19/2011 Indirect Beneficial 240000 S 
SNT 1/3/2012 Direct Beneficial 14723.85 S 
VKE 1/13/2012 Indirect Beneficial 62350 S 
OMN 1/13/2012 Direct Beneficial 785000 S 
SAC 1/20/2012 Direct Beneficial 47332.15 S 
RDF 1/30/2012 Direct Beneficial 9757.8 S 
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BAW 2/1/2012 Indirect Beneficial 49567.2 S 
RES 2/9/2012 Direct Beneficial 76000 S 
NPK 2/13/2012 Direct Beneficial 1794242.4 M 
SPG 2/21/2012 Direct Beneficial 970020 S 
CML 2/23/2012 Direct Beneficial 4445110 M 
CPL 2/23/2012 Indirect Beneficial 3424632.22 S 
ACP 2/27/2012 Indirect Beneficial 925564.8 S 
OMN 2/28/2012 Indirect Beneficial 240888344.2 S 
RBW 2/29/2012 Direct Beneficial 2420600 S 
RES 3/1/2012 Indirect Beneficial 502629.75 S 
GRT 3/2/2012 Direct Beneficial 113410 S 
NPN 3/7/2012 Direct Beneficial 282630.32 S 
TRE 3/9/2012 Indirect Beneficial 999750 S 
NED 3/12/2012 Direct Beneficial 986286.6 S 
NTC 3/13/2012 Direct Beneficial 1613.56 S 
SNU 3/13/2012 Direct Beneficial 69000 S 
LHC 3/16/2012 Indirect Beneficial 249300 S 
SHP 3/17/2012 Direct Beneficial 137890 S 
GFI 3/23/2012 Direct Beneficial 528400 S 
APN 3/23/2012 Indirect Beneficial 991800 S 
ABL 3/23/2012 Direct Beneficial 117766.25 S 
GRT 3/26/2012 Indirect Beneficial 124173 S 
VKE 3/30/2012 Direct Beneficial 114152 S 
NED 4/2/2012 Direct Beneficial 5191549.5 M 
LBH 4/3/2012 Direct Beneficial 359893.492 S 
SHF 4/10/2012 Indirect Beneficial 56528 S 
FSR 4/12/2012 Indirect Beneficial 400040 S 
CPI 4/24/2012 Direct Beneficial 4442500 S 
SHP 4/30/2012 Direct Beneficial 3988800 S 
ASR 5/4/2012 Direct Beneficial 291525 S 
SHF 5/14/2012 Indirect Beneficial 275000 S 
RES 5/16/2012 Indirect Beneficial 973317.89 S 
ABL 5/31/2012 Direct Beneficial 56637 S 
MDC 6/6/2012 Indirect Beneficial 10400 S 
SHF 6/7/2012 Indirect Beneficial 521800 S 
ABL 6/25/2012 Direct Beneficial 82753.65 S 
ABL 8/1/2012 Direct Beneficial 2403.8 S 
AIP 8/24/2012 Direct Beneficial 115.24 S 
HAR 9/3/2012 Direct Beneficial 989943 S 
SHF 9/10/2012 Direct Beneficial 266339000 S 
WHL 9/17/2012 Direct Beneficial 13724.67 S 
MMI 9/21/2012 Indirect Beneficial 868877.4552 S 
SHF 10/1/2012 Indirect Beneficial 683490.6 S 
SHP 10/8/2012 Direct Beneficial 1918680 S 
WBO 10/16/2012 Direct Beneficial 41556 S 
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AEG 10/19/2012 Direct Beneficial 44173.14 S 
GRF 11/5/2012 Direct Beneficial 2174869.5 S 
SNU 11/20/2012 Direct Beneficial 180000 S 
INL 11/22/2012 Indirect Beneficial 10800000 S 
SAP 11/27/2012 Direct Beneficial 140000 S 
AIP 11/30/2012 Direct Beneficial 59246 S 
CLH 12/4/2012 Indirect Beneficial 1651125 S 
KAP 12/7/2012 Indirect Beneficial 14750000 S 
SHF 12/12/2012 Direct Beneficial 256189.5 S 
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Appendix A2- Directors Dealings Sales Data 
 
Ticker Date Type Value Single/Multiple 
GRT 1/7/2009 Indirect Beneficial 104896.6 S 
INL 1/21/2009 Direct Beneficial 13980335 M 
CLS 1/23/2009 Direct Beneficial 1127565 S 
RDF 3/9/2009 Direct Beneficial 4720953 S 
AMS 3/12/2009 Direct Beneficial 928400 S 
SHP 3/19/2009 Direct Beneficial 742500 S 
SYC 3/19/2009 Indirect Beneficial 93607.5 S 
SAC 4/1/2009 Direct Beneficial 354000 S 
RDF 4/6/2009 Direct Beneficial 3300000 S 
SHP 4/9/2009 Direct Beneficial 178956 S 
WHL 4/29/2009 Direct Beneficial 1400004 S 
GFI 5/11/2009 Direct Beneficial 254745 S 
CPI 5/11/2009 Direct Beneficial 283500 S 
DSY 5/13/2009 Direct Beneficial 31260 S 
MSM 5/15/2009 Direct Beneficial 270727.3 S 
SHP 5/20/2009 Direct Beneficial 515100 S 
BLU 5/21/2009 Direct Beneficial 1911655 S 
SOL 5/29/2009 Direct Beneficial 3275886 S 
SHP 6/12/2009 Direct Beneficial 2085750 S 
RDF 6/22/2009 Indirect Beneficial 4221006 M 
LEW 6/30/2009 Direct Beneficial 3470545 M 
NTC 7/27/2009 Direct Beneficial 14947200 S 
NPK 8/3/2009 Direct Beneficial 129677.4 S 
SAP 8/5/2009 Direct Beneficial 27830 S 
ILV 8/25/2009 Direct Beneficial 26098.4 S 
SHP 8/27/2009 Indirect Beneficial 2392650 S 
TSH 8/27/2009 Direct Beneficial 31481.48 S 
SUI 8/31/2009 Direct Beneficial 197503.9 M 
GRT 9/3/2009 Indirect Beneficial 544820.9 S 
SAP 9/10/2009 Direct Beneficial 213813.6 S 
BVT 9/17/2009 Direct Beneficial 2420000 S 
BLU 9/30/2009 Indirect Beneficial 1179283 M 
SHF 10/13/2009 Direct Beneficial 11061480 S 
BVT 10/13/2009 Direct Beneficial 375937.5 S 
MSM 10/28/2009 Direct Beneficial 248959.2 S 
BLU 10/28/2009 Direct Beneficial 11599218 S 
RDF 11/2/2009 Indirect Beneficial 5864054 S 
SHP 11/9/2009 Direct Beneficial 307500 S 
NPK 12/1/2009 Direct Beneficial 10530 S 
SHP 12/1/2009 Direct Beneficial 168925.1 S 
GRT 12/2/2009 Indirect Beneficial 103575 S 
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REM 12/4/2009 Direct Beneficial 52632538 M 
SHF 12/9/2009 Indirect Beneficial 48974000 S 
INL 12/15/2009 Direct Beneficial 16123100 S 
SHP 12/22/2009 Direct Beneficial 13242000 S 
FSR 12/30/2009 Indirect Beneficial 5710630 S 
JDG 1/4/2010 Direct Beneficial 494000 S 
NPK 2/4/2010 Direct Beneficial 41896.5 S 
GRT 2/26/2010 Direct Beneficial 53060 S 
MSM 3/5/2010 Indirect Beneficial 1317685 s 
EXX 3/9/2010 Direct Beneficial 4492334 M 
WHL 3/10/2010 Indirect Beneficial 7150016 S 
NPN 3/30/2010 Indirect Beneficial 2297694 S 
MMI 4/7/2010 Direct Beneficial 454620 S 
MDC 4/29/2010 Indirect Beneficial 79632 S 
FBR 5/12/2010 Direct Beneficial 78000 S 
WHL 5/12/2010 Indirect Beneficial 5891856 S 
RBW 5/28/2010 Direct Beneficial 27316.2 M 
SHF 6/22/2010 Indirect Beneficial 4491161 S 
FBR 7/21/2010 Direct Beneficial 320000 S 
AMS 8/18/2010 Direct Beneficial 215040 S 
FBR 8/30/2010 Direct Beneficial 73046.4 S 
SHP 9/13/2010 Direct Beneficial 240375 M 
SOL 9/21/2010 Direct Beneficial 1393920 S 
WHL 9/27/2010 Indirect Beneficial 10179361 S 
BVT 10/21/2010 Direct Beneficial 1391560 S 
WHL 11/5/2010 Direct Beneficial 572808 M 
BVT 11/19/2010 Direct Beneficial 19933551 S 
MPC 11/19/2010 Indirect Beneficial 8091591 M 
AMS 12/6/2010 Direct Beneficial 70740 S 
NPN 12/7/2010 Direct Beneficial 4076565 S 
SAP 12/20/2010 Direct Beneficial 374171.1 S 
FBR 1/18/2011 Direct beneficial 1761881 S 
JDG 2/14/2011 Direct beneficial 304700 S 
ILV 2/16/2011 Direct beneficial 260680 S 
PIK 2/18/2011 Indirect beneficial 14306500 M 
FBR 2/21/2011 Direct beneficial 553215 S 
MND 2/22/2011 Direct beneficial 869388.3 M 
SHP 3/1/2011 Direct beneficial 667100 S 
GFI 3/1/2011 Direct beneficial 1980278 S 
ANG 3/3/2011 Direct beneficial 1369996 S 
WHL 3/8/2011 Indirect Beneficial 1077064 S 
NPN 3/16/2011 Direct beneficial 908351.5 S 
HAR 3/17/2011 Direct beneficial 1832209 S 
EMI 3/18/2011 Indirect beneficial 166056.6 S 
SOL 3/29/2011 Direct beneficial 865996 S 
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MMI 4/15/2011 Direct beneficial 5677288 S 
FSR 4/15/2011 Direct beneficial 22873181 S 
WHL 4/26/2011 Indirect beneficial 830353.2 M 
ALT 5/9/2011 Direct beneficial 140651.9 S 
SAP 5/12/2011 Direct Beneficial 990316.5 S 
WHL 5/20/2011 Indirect beneficial 4310184 M 
DST 5/21/2011 Direct Beneficial 3064740 S 
RBP 5/21/2011 Direct Beneficial 74068.8 S 
GFI 5/23/2011 Direct beneficial 1456230 S 
CPI 5/24/2011 Direct Beneficial 3633696 S 
SBK 5/27/2011 Direct beneficial 2547250 M 
SHP 5/31/2011 Direct beneficial 1000000 S 
PIK 6/1/2011 Direct beneficial 9276271 S 
SAP 6/2/2011 Direct beneficial 110340 M 
SNT 6/3/2011 Direct beneficial 1263080 S 
NTC 6/9/2011 Direct beneficial 1.51E+08 S 
GRT 6/10/2011 Indirect beneficial 974610.9 S 
APN 6/17/2011 Direct beneficial 778403.8 S 
SOL 6/24/2011 Direct beneficial 1133550 S 
SAP 6/27/2011 Direct Beneficial 120680 S 
REM 6/28/2011 Direct beneficial 5788670 M 
HCI 7/5/2011 Direct Beneficial 1593735 S 
MND 7/29/2011 Indirect beneficial 2158490 S 
NTC 8/1/2011 Direct beneficial 2886000 S 
RDF 8/1/2011 Direct beneficial 269722.4 S 
SAP 8/10/2011 Direct beneficial 622440 S 
GFI 8/11/2011 Direct beneficial 768691 S 
CPI 8/19/2011 Direct beneficial 166041 S 
RDF 8/30/2011 Direct beneficial 612000 S 
WHL 8/31/2011 Direct beneficial 17776629 S 
SHP 9/1/2011 Direct beneficial 2750 S 
TFG 9/8/2011 Indirect beneficial 13318881 S 
BVT 9/20/2011 Direct beneficial 2866125 S 
AMS 9/23/2011 Direct Beneficial 385866 S 
MUR 9/27/2011 Direct beneficial 473200 M 
GFI 9/27/2011 Direct beneficial 561933 S 
FSR 9/29/2011 Direct beneficial 282918.3 S 
RMH 10/10/2011 Direct beneficial 149400 S 
AMS 10/13/2011 Direct Beneficial 287500 S 
SOL 10/13/2011 Direct beneficial 6920000 S 
HYP 10/17/2011 Direct beneficial 4977.7 S 
BVT 10/19/2011 Direct beneficial 1429125 S 
WHL 11/3/2011 Direct Beneficial 1729320 S 
TFG 11/8/2011 Direct beneficial 8066822 M 
HCI 11/10/2011 Direct Beneficial 22160 S 
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GFI 11/11/2011 Direct beneficial 1639846 S 
ANG 11/14/2011 Direct beneficial 332644.4 S 
HAR 11/15/2011 Direct Beneficial 588285 S 
SOL 11/15/2011 Direct beneficial 5700000 S 
SUI 12/1/2011 Direct beneficial 3451380 M 
HCI 12/1/2011 Direct Beneficial 802191 S 
DST 12/2/2011 Direct beneficial 1348929 M 
OPT 12/5/2011 Direct beneficial 91200000 M 
ILV 12/6/2011 Direct beneficial 185785 S 
SAP 12/15/2011 Direct Beneficial 73197.96 S 
FBR 12/30/2011 Direct Beneficial 455000 S 
HYP 1/3/2012 Indirect Beneficial 96300 S 
FBR 1/3/2012 Direct Beneficial 897260 S 
NED 1/6/2012 Indirect Beneficial 43283.25 M 
NPN 1/10/2012 Direct Beneficial 2584080 S 
INL 1/12/2012 Direct Beneficial 31579.7 S 
MDC 1/17/2012 Direct Beneficial 47600 S 
CPI 1/26/2012 Direct Beneficial 65742.93 S 
ATN 1/27/2012 Direct Beneficial 714564 M 
FBR 1/27/2012 Direct Beneficial 274091.3 S 
RDF 2/7/2012 Indirect Beneficial 1952500 S 
OMN 2/8/2012 Indirect Beneficial 54000000 S 
LEW 2/15/2012 Direct Beneficial 239413.7 S 
HAR 2/16/2012 Direct Beneficial 69420 S 
CPI 2/17/2012 Direct Beneficial 550500 S 
NPN 2/17/2012 Direct Beneficial 18213429 S 
TFG 2/17/2012 Direct Beneficial 9561530 S 
GFI 2/17/2012 Direct Beneficial 59179.17 M 
NPK 2/20/2012 Direct Beneficial 690000 S 
DST 2/21/2012 Direct Beneficial 7850000 S 
MPC 2/23/2012 Indirect Beneficial 26730000 S 
MND 2/24/2012 Direct Beneficial 2662059 M 
BVT 2/27/2012 Indirect Beneficial 21792753 S 
LHC 2/28/2012 Indirect Beneficial 5666341 M 
FBR 2/29/2012 Direct Beneficial 450500 S 
GRT 2/29/2012 Direct Beneficial 24986.5 S 
IPL 2/29/2012 Direct Beneficial 21279000 S 
SAP 3/1/2012 Direct Beneficial 246342.6 S 
TRU 3/1/2012 Indirect Beneficial 8050000 S 
NED 3/5/2012 Direct Beneficial 8516463 S 
DSY 3/5/2012 Direct Beneficial 244800 S 
CAT 3/5/2012 Direct Beneficial 760000 S 
JDG 3/5/2012 Direct Beneficial 425687.5 S 
SNT 3/5/2012 Direct Beneficial 6339697 S 
NPN 3/5/2012 Direct Beneficial 1964563 S 
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HYP 3/6/2012 Indirect Beneficial 5657641 S 
NTC 3/6/2012 Direct Beneficial 3002287 S 
GRT 3/8/2012 Direct Beneficial 667520 S 
GFI 3/9/2012 Direct Beneficial 116452 S 
SBK 3/12/2012 Direct Beneficial 374476.2 M 
LBH 3/12/2012 Direct Beneficial 618000.2 S 
HYP 3/12/2012 Indirect Beneficial 60750000 S 
MND 3/13/2012 Direct Beneficial 16776707 M 
HLM 3/13/2012 Direct Beneficial 77558.93 M 
SAP 3/13/2012 Direct Beneficial 157760 S 
ABL 3/14/2012 Indirect Beneficial 1429505 S 
SNU 3/14/2012 Direct Beneficial 231627.4 S 
DSY 3/14/2012 Direct Beneficial 2524000 S 
INL 3/14/2012 Direct Beneficial 1351129 S 
PPC 3/14/2012 Direct Beneficial 185136.3 S 
TFG 3/15/2012 Indirect Beneficial 5521000 S 
MPC 3/16/2012 Indirect Beneficial 8750 M 
BVT 3/19/2012 Direct Beneficial 5299800 S 
NPK 3/22/2012 Direct Beneficial 530400 S 
SNT 3/22/2012 Direct Beneficial 3610860 S 
MDC 3/23/2012 Direct Beneficial 260400 S 
NPN 3/26/2012 Indirect Beneficial 80675098 S 
NTC 3/27/2012 Direct Beneficial 720000 S 
CPI 4/5/2012 Direct Beneficial 625830 S 
GND 4/10/2012 Indirect Beneficial 234600 S 
SHP 4/12/2012 Direct Beneficial 676050 S 
GRT 4/12/2012 Direct Beneficial 310936.9 S 
IPL 4/17/2012 Direct Beneficial 4157500 S 
AMS 4/18/2012 Direct Beneficial 2411534 M 
DST 5/4/2012 Direct Beneficial 146216 S 
MRF 5/4/2012 Direct Beneficial 690382 M 
CPI 5/7/2012 Direct Beneficial 2120332 M 
TRU 5/8/2012 Direct Beneficial 2200309 S 
OPT 5/9/2012 Direct Beneficial 190000 S 
CLH 5/15/2012 Direct Beneficial 489000 S 
BVT 5/16/2012 Direct Beneficial 13293073 S 
MUR 5/25/2012 Direct Beneficial 331950 S 
CPI 5/29/2012 Direct Beneficial 2230000 S 
DST 5/30/2012 Direct Beneficial 769051.9 S 
FBR 5/30/2012 Direct Beneficial 494532 S 
RBP 5/31/2012 Direct Beneficial 734996.8 S 
MPC 5/31/2012 Indirect Beneficial 41568000 S 
ASR 6/7/2012 Direct Beneficial 4846680 S 
RBP 6/12/2012 Direct Beneficial 286778.3 S 
CPI 6/19/2012 Direct Beneficial 13024200 S 
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SHP 6/21/2012 Direct Beneficial 1507100 S 
RBP 6/22/2012 Direct Beneficial 2998099 S 
NPK 6/22/2012 Direct Beneficial 177926 S 
HCI 6/25/2012 Direct Beneficial 1736800 S 
SNT 6/25/2012 Direct Beneficial 1098370 S 
DTC 7/26/2012 Direct Beneficial 1077016 S 
FBR 8/23/2012 Direct Beneficial 13550000 S 
DST 8/30/2012 Direct Beneficial 169459 S 
BLU 9/3/2012 Direct Beneficial 144050 S 
WBO 9/5/2012 Direct Beneficial 5013634 S 
DSY 9/14/2012 Direct Beneficial 1107820 S 
AVI 9/18/2012 Direct Beneficial 475120 S 
DST 9/20/2012 Direct Beneficial 920738.8 S 
SIM 9/27/2012 Direct Beneficial 25000 S 
WHL 10/2/2012 Indirect Beneficial 5047018 S 
BVT 10/17/2012 Direct Beneficial 2017899 S 
DSY 10/18/2012 Indirect Beneficial 19188597 S 
SIM 10/23/2012 Direct Beneficial 56304 S 
REM 10/24/2012 Direct Beneficial 180500 S 
JDG 10/25/2012 Direct Beneficial 4819.9 S 
IPL 11/2/2012 Direct Beneficial 218457.2 S 
MDC 11/6/2012 Direct Beneficial 1036842 S 
DST 11/7/2012 Direct Beneficial 97141.96 S 
DSY 11/13/2012 Indirect Beneficial 5510520 S 
BLU 11/16/2012 Indirect Beneficial 1.17E+08 S 
WHL 11/16/2012 Indirect Beneficial 66008279 S 
FBR 11/29/2012 Direct Beneficial 577584 S 
OMN 12/3/2012 Direct Beneficial 66500 S 
RBP 12/4/2012 Direct Beneficial 2850000 S 
SHF 12/6/2012 Indirect Beneficial 11494025 S 
AVI 12/11/2012 Direct Beneficial 1195000 S 
HCI 12/13/2012 Direct Beneficial 1160280 S 
RLO 12/20/2012 Direct Beneficial 1544801 S 
SAP 12/24/2012 Direct Beneficial 14100.84 S 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Appendix B1 – AARs and CAARs for overall Purchases Sample 
 
PURCHASES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.25% -0.25% 
-9 0.17% -0.08% 
-8 -0.19% -0.27% 
-7 -0.21% -0.49% 
-6 -0.14% -0.62% 
-5 -0.04% -0.66% 
-4 0.14% -0.52% 
-3 -0.14% -0.65% 
-2 0.21% -0.45% 
-1 -0.01% -0.46% 
0 -0.13% -0.59% 
1 0.46% -0.13% 
2 0.00% -0.12% 
3 0.40% 0.27% 
4 0.11% 0.38% 
5 0.04% 0.41% 
6 0.07% 0.49% 
7 -0.01% 0.48% 
8 -0.07% 0.41% 
9 0.10% 0.51% 
10 -0.02% 0.49% 
11 -0.25% 0.24% 
12 0.25% 0.50% 
13 -0.29% 0.20% 
14 -0.16% 0.04% 
15 0.33% 0.37% 
16 -0.41% -0.04% 
17 0.06% 0.02% 
18 -0.04% -0.03% 
19 -0.14% -0.16% 
20 0.03% -0.14% 
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Appendix B2 – AARs and CAARs for overall Sales Sample 
 
SALES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.15% -0.15% 
-9 0.36% 0.21% 
-8 0.17% 0.37% 
-7 0.13% 0.50% 
-6 0.04% 0.54% 
-5 0.11% 0.65% 
-4 0.26% 0.91% 
-3 0.07% 0.98% 
-2 0.08% 1.07% 
-1 0.11% 1.18% 
0 -0.14% 1.03% 
1 -0.30% 0.74% 
2 -0.06% 0.67% 
3 -0.03% 0.64% 
4 -0.01% 0.63% 
5 -0.08% 0.56% 
6 0.08% 0.63% 
7 0.20% 0.83% 
8 -0.23% 0.60% 
9 0.15% 0.75% 
10 -0.33% 0.42% 
11 0.18% 0.60% 
12 -0.03% 0.56% 
13 -0.06% 0.51% 
14 -0.18% 0.33% 
15 0.03% 0.36% 
16 0.01% 0.38% 
17 -0.36% 0.02% 
18 0.04% 0.06% 
19 -0.23% -0.17% 
20 0.14% -0.03% 
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Appendix B3 – AARs and CAARs for Single Purchases 
SINGLE PURCHASES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.36% -0.36% 
-9 0.30% -0.06% 
-8 -0.23% -0.29% 
-7 -0.26% -0.56% 
-6 -0.16% -0.71% 
-5 -0.07% -0.78% 
-4 0.22% -0.56% 
-3 -0.20% -0.76% 
-2 0.29% -0.48% 
-1 -0.07% -0.55% 
0 -0.07% -0.62% 
1 0.46% -0.15% 
2 -0.04% -0.19% 
3 0.48% 0.29% 
4 0.12% 0.41% 
5 0.12% 0.54% 
6 0.06% 0.60% 
7 0.04% 0.64% 
8 -0.18% 0.46% 
9 0.21% 0.67% 
10 0.03% 0.70% 
11 -0.25% 0.45% 
12 0.21% 0.65% 
13 -0.33% 0.32% 
14 -0.16% 0.17% 
15 0.40% 0.57% 
16 -0.38% 0.19% 
17 0.17% 0.36% 
18 -0.01% 0.35% 
19 -0.21% 0.14% 
20 0.06% 0.20% 
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Appendix B4 – AARs and CAARs for Multiple Purchases 
MULTIPLE PURCHASES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 0.23% 0.23% 
-9 -0.37% -0.15% 
-8 -0.03% -0.18% 
-7 -0.01% -0.19% 
-6 -0.05% -0.24% 
-5 0.09% -0.15% 
-4 -0.18% -0.33% 
-3 0.13% -0.19% 
-2 -0.13% -0.32% 
-1 0.22% -0.10% 
0 -0.36% -0.46% 
1 0.44% -0.01% 
2 0.17% 0.15% 
3 0.02% 0.17% 
4 0.05% 0.23% 
5 -0.33% -0.10% 
6 0.14% 0.04% 
7 -0.22% -0.18% 
8 0.35% 0.17% 
9 -0.32% -0.15% 
10 -0.23% -0.38% 
11 -0.22% -0.60% 
12 0.44% -0.16% 
13 -0.14% -0.30% 
14 -0.19% -0.49% 
15 -0.01% -0.50% 
16 -0.49% -0.99% 
17 -0.42% -1.41% 
18 -0.18% -1.59% 
19 0.17% -1.41% 
20 -0.12% -1.54% 
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Appendix B5 – AARs and CAARs for Single Sales 
SINGLE SALES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.13% -0.13% 
-9 0.37% 0.24% 
-8 0.21% 0.44% 
-7 0.05% 0.49% 
-6 0.11% 0.60% 
-5 0.12% 0.72% 
-4 0.28% 1.00% 
-3 0.08% 1.09% 
-2 0.07% 1.16% 
-1 0.15% 1.31% 
0 -0.17% 1.14% 
1 -0.32% 0.82% 
2 -0.05% 0.77% 
3 -0.01% 0.76% 
4 -0.10% 0.65% 
5 -0.07% 0.58% 
6 0.09% 0.67% 
7 0.24% 0.91% 
8 -0.33% 0.58% 
9 0.18% 0.76% 
10 -0.33% 0.43% 
11 0.20% 0.64% 
12 -0.04% 0.59% 
13 -0.10% 0.50% 
14 -0.19% 0.31% 
15 0.04% 0.35% 
16 0.00% 0.35% 
17 -0.39% -0.04% 
18 0.04% 0.00% 
19 -0.27% -0.27% 
20 0.18% -0.09% 
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Appendix B6 – AARs and CAARs for Multiple Sales 
MULTIPLE SALES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.28% -0.28% 
-9 0.27% 0.00% 
-8 -0.17% -0.18% 
-7 0.64% 0.46% 
-6 -0.38% 0.08% 
-5 0.10% 0.18% 
-4 0.11% 0.29% 
-3 0.10% 0.39% 
-2 0.15% 0.54% 
-1 0.12% 0.66% 
0 -0.09% 0.58% 
1 -0.25% 0.33% 
2 -0.02% 0.31% 
3 -0.26% 0.05% 
4 0.57% 0.62% 
5 -0.06% 0.56% 
6 0.02% 0.58% 
7 -0.09% 0.49% 
8 0.36% 0.86% 
9 -0.03% 0.83% 
10 -0.38% 0.45% 
11 0.05% 0.50% 
12 0.04% 0.54% 
13 0.15% 0.69% 
14 -0.13% 0.55% 
15 -0.02% 0.53% 
16 0.12% 0.65% 
17 -0.14% 0.51% 
18 0.07% 0.58% 
19 0.25% 0.83% 
20 -0.23% 0.60% 
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Appendix B7 – AARs and CAARs for Directly Beneficial Purchases Data 
DIRECTLY BENEFICIAL PURCHASES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.04% -0.04% 
-9 -0.09% -0.13% 
-8 -0.03% -0.16% 
-7 -0.14% -0.30% 
-6 -0.04% -0.34% 
-5 -0.27% -0.61% 
-4 -0.03% -0.64% 
-3 0.13% -0.50% 
-2 0.03% -0.47% 
-1 -0.12% -0.59% 
0 0.18% -0.41% 
1 0.28% -0.13% 
2 0.23% 0.10% 
3 0.20% 0.30% 
4 0.13% 0.42% 
5 -0.10% 0.33% 
6 -0.04% 0.29% 
7 0.02% 0.31% 
8 -0.05% 0.26% 
9 0.11% 0.37% 
10 -0.06% 0.31% 
11 0.06% 0.37% 
12 0.01% 0.38% 
13 0.05% 0.44% 
14 -0.14% 0.30% 
15 0.06% 0.35% 
16 -0.31% 0.05% 
17 0.03% 0.08% 
18 -0.09% -0.01% 
19 -0.06% -0.07% 
20 0.05% -0.03% 
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Appendix B8 – AARs and CAARs for Indirectly Beneficial Purchases Data 
INDIRECTLY BENEFICIAL PURCHASES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.68% -0.68% 
-9 0.71% 0.03% 
-8 -0.52% -0.49% 
-7 -0.34% -0.83% 
-6 -0.34% -1.17% 
-5 0.41% -0.76% 
-4 0.49% -0.27% 
-3 -0.68% -0.95% 
-2 0.53% -0.42% 
-1 0.18% -0.24% 
0 -0.75% -0.99% 
1 0.84% -0.15% 
2 -0.45% -0.60% 
3 0.78% 0.18% 
4 0.08% 0.26% 
5 0.31% 0.57% 
6 0.29% 0.85% 
7 -0.05% 0.80% 
8 -0.12% 0.68% 
9 0.10% 0.78% 
10 0.06% 0.84% 
11 -0.87% -0.03% 
12 0.72% 0.69% 
13 -0.96% -0.27% 
14 -0.21% -0.48% 
15 0.87% 0.38% 
16 -0.61% -0.22% 
17 0.11% -0.11% 
18 0.06% -0.06% 
19 -0.28% -0.34% 
20 -0.04% -0.38% 
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Appendix B9 – AARs and CAARs for Directly Beneficial Sales Data 
DIRECTLY BENEFICIAL SALES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.16% -0.16% 
-9 0.43% 0.27% 
-8 0.27% 0.54% 
-7 0.14% 0.68% 
-6 0.08% 0.76% 
-5 0.02% 0.78% 
-4 0.33% 1.11% 
-3 0.11% 1.21% 
-2 0.05% 1.27% 
-1 0.07% 1.34% 
0 -0.16% 1.18% 
1 -0.37% 0.81% 
2 -0.09% 0.72% 
3 -0.04% 0.68% 
4 0.00% 0.68% 
5 -0.13% 0.55% 
6 0.09% 0.64% 
7 0.27% 0.91% 
8 -0.36% 0.55% 
9 0.19% 0.74% 
10 -0.38% 0.36% 
11 0.21% 0.57% 
12 -0.03% 0.55% 
13 -0.04% 0.51% 
14 -0.22% 0.29% 
15 -0.02% 0.28% 
16 -0.01% 0.27% 
17 -0.44% -0.17% 
18 0.02% -0.15% 
19 -0.27% -0.42% 
20 0.18% -0.25% 
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Appendix B10 – AARs and CAARs for Indirectly Beneficial Sales Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDIRECTLY BENEFICIAL SALES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.10% -0.10% 
-9 0.03% -0.07% 
-8 -0.27% -0.34% 
-7 0.05% -0.29% 
-6 -0.12% -0.41% 
-5 0.50% 0.09% 
-4 -0.02% 0.07% 
-3 -0.07% 0.00% 
-2 0.20% 0.20% 
-1 0.28% 0.47% 
0 -0.05% 0.43% 
1 0.01% 0.43% 
2 0.05% 0.48% 
3 0.02% 0.50% 
4 -0.07% 0.43% 
5 0.16% 0.58% 
6 0.02% 0.60% 
7 -0.11% 0.49% 
8 0.32% 0.81% 
9 -0.03% 0.78% 
10 -0.12% 0.66% 
11 0.03% 0.69% 
12 -0.05% 0.64% 
13 -0.12% 0.51% 
14 0.00% 0.51% 
15 0.23% 0.74% 
16 0.09% 0.83% 
17 0.00% 0.83% 
18 0.13% 0.96% 
19 -0.07% 0.89% 
20 0.00% 0.89% 
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Appendix B11 – AARs and CAARs for High Value Purchases Data 
HIGH VALUE PURCHASES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 0.24% 0.24% 
-9 -0.11% 0.14% 
-8 0.10% 0.24% 
-7 0.01% 0.24% 
-6 0.21% 0.45% 
-5 -0.05% 0.41% 
-4 -0.27% 0.14% 
-3 0.08% 0.22% 
-2 0.06% 0.28% 
-1 -0.17% 0.11% 
0 0.05% 0.16% 
1 0.02% 0.19% 
2 0.55% 0.74% 
3 0.25% 0.99% 
4 0.14% 1.12% 
5 0.14% 1.26% 
6 0.33% 1.59% 
7 0.08% 1.67% 
8 -0.02% 1.65% 
9 -0.07% 1.58% 
10 0.00% 1.58% 
11 -0.05% 1.53% 
12 0.42% 1.95% 
13 -0.01% 1.93% 
14 -0.22% 1.71% 
15 0.11% 1.82% 
16 -0.51% 1.31% 
17 0.09% 1.41% 
18 0.12% 1.53% 
19 -0.09% 1.44% 
20 -0.06% 1.38% 
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Appendix B12 – AARs and CAARs for Low Value Purchases Data 
LOW VALUE PURCHASES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.16% -0.16% 
-9 0.24% 0.08% 
-8 -0.31% -0.23% 
-7 -0.46% -0.69% 
-6 -0.35% -1.04% 
-5 -0.19% -1.24% 
-4 0.12% -1.12% 
-3 0.02% -1.09% 
-2 -0.21% -1.30% 
-1 -0.07% -1.38% 
0 0.15% -1.23% 
1 0.28% -0.95% 
2 -0.09% -1.04% 
3 0.01% -1.04% 
4 0.02% -1.01% 
5 -0.08% -1.09% 
6 -0.17% -1.26% 
7 -0.05% -1.32% 
8 0.16% -1.16% 
9 -0.06% -1.22% 
10 -0.08% -1.30% 
11 -0.09% -1.38% 
12 -0.03% -1.41% 
13 -0.03% -1.44% 
14 -0.23% -1.67% 
15 0.13% -1.54% 
16 -0.10% -1.64% 
17 -0.06% -1.70% 
18 0.21% -1.49% 
19 -0.25% -1.74% 
20 -0.05% -1.79% 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
 
 
Appendix B13 – AARs and CAARs for High Value Sales Data 
HIGH VALUE SALES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 0.05% 0.05% 
-9 -0.01% 0.04% 
-8 0.02% 0.05% 
-7 0.32% 0.38% 
-6 -0.16% 0.21% 
-5 0.13% 0.35% 
-4 0.03% 0.38% 
-3 0.16% 0.54% 
-2 0.31% 0.85% 
-1 0.11% 0.96% 
0 0.14% 1.10% 
1 -0.07% 1.03% 
2 -0.14% 0.89% 
3 0.09% 0.99% 
4 0.08% 1.07% 
5 -0.17% 0.89% 
6 0.13% 1.02% 
7 0.17% 1.19% 
8 0.22% 1.41% 
9 0.03% 1.43% 
10 -0.25% 1.18% 
11 0.03% 1.21% 
12 -0.04% 1.18% 
13 -0.08% 1.10% 
14 -0.21% 0.89% 
15 0.11% 0.99% 
16 -0.16% 0.84% 
17 -0.34% 0.50% 
18 0.22% 0.72% 
19 -0.14% 0.58% 
20 0.00% 0.58% 
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Appendix B14 – AARs and CAARs for Low Value Sales Data 
LOW VALUE SALES DATA 
 Event Window  AAR (%) CAAR (%) 
-10 -0.33% -0.33% 
-9 0.78% 0.45% 
-8 0.46% 0.91% 
-7 -0.11% 0.80% 
-6 -0.01% 0.79% 
-5 0.02% 0.81% 
-4 0.44% 1.25% 
-3 0.01% 1.26% 
-2 0.13% 1.38% 
-1 0.05% 1.43% 
0 -0.44% 0.99% 
1 -0.62% 0.37% 
2 -0.02% 0.35% 
3 -0.09% 0.26% 
4 -0.19% 0.07% 
5 0.01% 0.08% 
6 -0.09% -0.02% 
7 0.64% 0.62% 
8 -0.68% -0.06% 
9 0.46% 0.40% 
10 -0.50% -0.10% 
11 0.39% 0.28% 
12 0.25% 0.54% 
13 -0.17% 0.37% 
14 -0.13% 0.24% 
15 -0.08% 0.16% 
16 0.19% 0.35% 
17 -0.38% -0.03% 
18 -0.32% -0.35% 
19 -0.37% -0.72% 
20 0.33% -0.38% 
 
 
